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EMINENT DOMAIN: VALUATION OF DIFFERENT
REAL PROPERTY INTERESTS IN NEBRASKA.
INTRODUCTION
Under the laws of Nebraska, prior to the passage of the Nebraska
Uniform Eminent Domain Act' in 1951, each body that had been
delegated the power of eminent domain had a specific set of stat-
utes2 setting out the procedure it was to follow in condemnation
proceedings. The language of the various statutes differed and the
procedure was not uniform. To a large extent, the enactment of
19513 remedied these differences; however, a current controversy
remains concerning the duties of court appointed appraisers when
valuing property in which several people have an interest.
Nebraska is currently confronted with the problem of valuation
of damages to the separate interests of real property condemned
under the Act. A conflict exists between other state court interpre-
tations of similar statutes and interpretations by the Nebraska
Supreme Court prior to the passage of the Act in 1951. This com-
ment will consider the two prominent doctrines in the United States
concerned with the question of valuation of separate interests in real
property; the majority accept the unit valuation doctrine which
asserts that the property must first be valuated as a whole and then
apportioned among the different interests. There is a minority sepa-
rate valuation doctrine which determines that different interests in
property are entitled to be valuated separately in assessing damages.
The Nebraska Uniform Eminent Domain Act contains two statu-
tory sections around which the controversy seems to center. Section
76-706, provides that:
The county judge shall direct the sheriff to summon the appraisers
so selected to convene at the office of the county judge at a time
specified in the summons for the purpose of qualifying as ap-
praisers, and thereafter proceed to appraise the property sought
to be condemned and to ascertain and determine the damages sus-
tained by the condemnee. 4
1 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-701 et. seq. (Reissue 1966).
2 E.g., Law of April 20, 1921, c. 116, art. III, §§ 59-62 (1921) Neb.
Laws 208 (repealed 1951), condemnation procedure for cities of the
metropolitan class; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 31-321, -322 (1943), as amended,
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 31-321, -322 (Reissue 1968), condemnation proce-
dure for drainage districts.
3 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-701 et. seq. (Reissue 1966).
4 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-706 (Reissue 1966).
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Section 76-710, provides that:
After the inspection, view, and hearing provided for... have been
completed, the appraisers shall assess the damages that the con-
demnee has sustained or will sustain by the appropriation of the
property to the use of the condemnor, and make and file a report
thereof in writing with the county judge.5
Unfortunately, there are no Nebraska cases interpreting the
duties of court appointed appraisers in the valuation of property in
which several persons have an interest.6 Therefore, to understand
the meaning the legislature intended when these sections were en-
acted, it is necessary to review the case law and relevant statutes
governing such cases prior to passage of the Act, together with the
relevant portions of that Act. Due consideration is also given to
eminent domain statutes of other states and interpretative decisions.
An analysis will then be made concerning whether different estates
or interests in real property taken under the Nebraska Uniform
Eminent Domain Act are to be valued separately, or whether the
entire property is to be valued as a unit and the amount apportioned
among the separate interests.
NEBRASKA CASE HISTORY PRIOR TO THE UNIFORM ACT
The earliest Nebraska cases concerning the condemnation of
separate interests in real property established the duty of the con-
demnor to bring all parties into the condemnation proceedings
having an interest in the estate.7 For example, as early as 1913, it
was stated in Gerrard v. Omaha, Niobrara & Black Hills Railroad8
that condemnors have a "duty to bring in all parties having an inter-
est in the estate in order that the condemnation money may be
5 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-710 (Reissue 1966).
6 State v. Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 147 Neb. 289,
23 N.W.2d 300 (1946), held the general rule to be that the aggregated
damages will not exceed the value of the entire parcel taken, but if
the damage to the individual interests when added together exceed
the value of the property as a whole, the individual condemnee is
entitled to be compensated in damages for the amount of his interest
taken. This decision was prior to the Nebraska Uniform Eminent
Domain Act and involved the condemnation of leased school lands
under NEB. REv. STAT. § 72-225 (Reissue 1966).
7 State v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 75 Neb. 4, 105 N.W. 983 (1905),
held that if a railway company, in condemnation proceedings, fails
to make all parties with interests in the land parties to the pro-
ceedings or to give them notice of the proceeding so that their rights
may be protected, it takes the land subject to such liens as are prior
to the rights of the parties to the proceeding. See also Consumers
Pub. Power Dist. v. Eldred, 146 Neb. 926, 22 N.W.2d 188 (1946).
8 14 Neb. 270, 15 N.W. 231 (1883).
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properly applied."9 Gerrard, however, did not mention whether
separate determinations of the value of each party's interest were
required.
The Nebraska Supreme Court alluded to the separate valuation
concept in Omaha Bridge & Terminal Ry. v. Reed,10 where it estab-
lished that mortgagees had a right to appeal separately from owners
of the fee because they "would have a substantial interest in the
augmentation of the fund which is subject to their lien."" The
Omaha Bridge decision could be used to support the separate valua-
tion doctrine if it was intended that any increase in damages
awarded to the mortgagees be added to the total fund rather than
decrease the amount awarded to the fee owner. If this were accom-
plished the court would actually be applying the doctrine of sepa-
rate valuation.12 It should be noted that the Omaha Bridge decision
did not consider the problem of whether to adopt the separate
valuation doctrine, but by its decision it is likely that separate valu-
ation of each separate interest will in fact occur.
In Beste v. Cedar County, 3 the Nebraska Supreme Court moved
toward holding that separate determination of each interest is per-
mitted when the aggregate of the damages suffered by each interest
would exceed the amount of damages if valued as a whole unit. The
Beste decision held that a lessee of school land is entitled to damages
to the extent of his injury without joining the state as plaintiff. 4
9 Id. at 271, 15 N.W. at 231.
10 3 Neb. (Unof.) 793, 92 N.W. 1021 (1902), aff'd., 69 Neb. 514, 96 N.W.
276 (1903).
11 3 Neb. (Unof.) at 796, 92 N.W. at 1022.
12 The court first determined the total value of the land as a unit, which
established a fund to be apportioned among the separate interests. If
then on appeal the court increases the amount of damages for a
particular interest without decreasing the amount available to other
interests, it would in fact be determining the amount of damages
by consideration of the amount of damages to each separate interest.
Of course, if in increasing the award to the particular interest the
court reduces the amount available to the other interests by a cor-
responding amount, then the court would be maintaining the value
as a unit doctrine.
13 87 Neb. 689, 128 N.W. 29 (1910). This decision was governed by Neb.
Laws, 1879, p. 130, § 46; Neb. Comp. St. 1905, c. 78, § 46, which did
not require that damages be assessed on each different interest
separately.
14 In a decision prior to Beste, it was held that a purchaser of real
estate, and holding the same by contract, may maintain an action in
such case for the damages sustained by him. The court added that "at
the most there was a defect in parties; but no objection... was made
... and therefore he was entitled to recover for the injury to his
interest." Hastings & G.I. R.R. v. Ingalls, 15 Neb. 123, 129, 16 N.W. 762,
764 (1883).
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This offers strong support for the separate valuation concept, for if
a lessee is permitted to bring suit for damages without joining the
landowner as a party it would in fact be allowing each separate
party to have his interest valued separately. However, because of
the Gerrard decision establishing the condemnor's duty to bring in
all interested parties, separate valuation would rarely occur.
Before passage of the Nebraska Uniform Eminent Domain Act,
the strongest Nebraska case recognizing the doctrine of separate
valuation was State v. Platte Valley Public Power & Irrigation
District,15 in which the court stated:
The rule is generally recognized (though not invariably followed)
that, where there are several interests or estates in a parcel of
real estate taken by eminent domain, a proper method of fixing
the value of, or damage to, each interest or estate, is to determine
the value of, or damage to, the property as a whole, and then to
apportion the same among the several owners according to their
respective interests or estates, rather than to take each interest or
estate as a unit and fix the value thereof, or damage thereto, sepa-
rately. Even where separate petitions are filed and the damages
are separately assessed, the compensation awarded will not exceed
the value of the entire parcel taken. But it sometimes happens
that the land as a whole is not damaged at all, though the owner
of one interest suffers substantial injury, or the damage to the
various interests when added together exceeds the value of the
property as a whole. In such cases each is entitled to be compen-
sated in damages for the amount of his interest taken, and if it
be true that the values of the two interests are more than the
land would be worth if owned by one person, the necessities of
the case require an apparent exception to the general rule an-
nounced above as to what the condemning party must pay.16
This statement clearly indicates an intention to place primary
emphasis upon just and equitable compensation to all interested
parties, rather than adhering strictly to a general rule requiring that
total damages not exceed the value of the property as a whole. The
Platte Valley decision apparently establishes that damages are to be
determined by valuation of the property as a unit, unless this would
result in an inequitable apportionment to the individual parties. If
inequities would result from valuing the property as a unit it
seemingly approves measuring each individual party's damages by
a separate valuation of his particular damages.'7
15 147 Neb. 289, 23 N.W.2d 300 (1946).
16 Id. at 305, 23 N.W.2d at 310.
17 It should be noted that Platte Valley involved the condemnation of
state owned school lands that were under lease, and thus was gov-
erned by NEB. REV. STAT. § 72-225 (Reissue 1966), which provides: Iqf
the land to be taken is held under lease contract, a finding shall be
made as to the interest of the owner in such lease contract, and such
value shall be separately assessed. If the land is held under contract
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The Platte Valley opinion supported its holding by noting that
the Constitution of Nebraska' 8 would require such a decision, and
went on to state:
[Ojur Constitution provides that the property of no person shall
be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.
The measures of compensation to each owner must be that which
he has lost. It seems to us that those courts which have held that
the sum of the separate values of the divided interests may be less
than the value of the unencumbered whole have followed this
principle. It also seems to us that those courts which have held
divided interests may not exceed the value of the unencumbered
whole have at that point abandoned the rule that the measure is
what has the owner lost, and applied the rule that the measure is
what has the taker gained.' 9
This statement indicates that if the courts are going to consist-
ently apply the rule that the measure of damages is what the owner
has lost, they must then provide for separate valuation of different
interests if the sum of such valuation would exceed the value of the
property as a whole. Apparently, the court's reasoning in Platte
Valley is that the Nebraska Constitution requires "just compensa-
tion" to be paid to all interested parties in condemnation proceed-
ings. The court defines the measure of just compensation as the
value of the interest the owner has lost, and thus if the courts pro-
hibit the total damages awarded to exceed the value of the property
as a whole it violates the Constitutional requirement of "just com-
pensation." For if the sum of the damages to each separate party's
interest exceeds the value of the property as a whole, then separate
valuation must be permitted or "just compensation" will not be
provided for all interested parties.
This doctrine of separate valuation, as set forth in Platte Valley,
was adopted, at least in part, in the recent decision of Iske v. Metro-
politan Utilities Dist.20 The Nebraska Supreme Court approved the
of sale, the interest of the owner of such sale contract shall be sepa-
rately assessed." This statute provided an easy means of disposing of
the case without dealing with the issue of whether separate valua-
tion of different interests is permissible when this would result in
the total damages exceeding the amount of damages if the land is
valued as a whole. Therefore, the Platte Valley decision can be read
as offering strong support for separate valuation of each individual
interest when to do otherwise would result in an unjust and inequit-
able apportionment of damages to the separate interests.
18 NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 21.
19 147 Neb. at 307-08, 23 N.W.2d at 311. This doctrine is supported by
Mathis v. State, 178 Neb. 701, 135 N.W.2d 17 (1965), where the Ne-
braska Supreme Court stated that: "Compensation to a condemnee
depends upon his pecuniary loss. It is the owner's loss, not the taker's
gain, which is the measure of compensation for property taken." Id.
at 707, 135 N.W.2d at 21.
20 183 Neb. 34, 157 N.W.2d 887 (1968).
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lower court's instruction to the jury for the awarding of damages
to a leasehold interest. The Iske decision concluded that:
Instruction No. 12 advised the jury that its verdict concerning
the taking of the leasehold interest " ... will find for the plaintiff,
Gerhold Company, A [sic] Corporation, and in assessing the amount
of its recovery you will award to it such sum of money, if any, as
you find it has proved by a preponderance of this evidence will be
just compensation...." The verdict form followed the language
of the instruction and contained a finding for the plaintiff and a
blank for the amount of recovery.2 '
This instruction indicates that the jury should separately deter-
mine the amount of damages to the leasehold interest. However,
the Iske decision did not decide whether the total damages to the
separate interests could exceed the value of the proprty as a whole.
22
POLICY ON SEPARATE VALUATION IN OTHER STATES
The leading case, State ex rel. McCaskill v. Hall,2 3 held the
refusal in a condemnation proceeding to separately assess the dam-
ages for a leasehold interest was not a violation of the United States
or Missouri Constitutions 24 as denying due process or taking prop-
erty without compensation. The Hall decision also supported the
general rule that the court ascertain all damages of the property as
a whole, and then apportion this fund among the separate interests.
However, the court in Hall went on to say:
There may be instances in which, owing to exceptional circum-
stances, the damages to the various interests when added together
exceed the value of the property as a whole; in such case the
particular interests should of course be separately appraised,
because the owner of each is entitled to be compensated in damages
for the amount of his interest taken. But no showing of that kind
was made in the circuit court in the proceeding under considera-
tion, nor is any such contention made here.25
21 Id. at 48, 157 N.W.2d at 897.
22 Although there is dicta to the effect that the total value of the various
separate interests should not exceed the value of the property as a
whole, the Iske opinion noted: "[W]here land taken by eminent
domain has a reasonable prospective use for recreational and sub-
division purposes, this circumstance may be considered so far as it
may affect the market value of the land at the time of the taking,
and that part of the realty cannot be separately valued for its pros-
pective use for recreational and subdivision purposes as an item in
addition to the market value of the land." Id. at 47, 157 N.W.2d at 896.
See, e.g., State v. Dillon, 175 Neb. 350, 121 N.W.2d 798 (1963); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. City of Omaha, 171 Neb. 457, 106 N.W.2d 727 (1960).
23 325 Mo. 165,28 S.W.2d 80 (1930).
24 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1; Mo. CoNsT. art. 1, § 28.
25 325 Mo. at 172, 28 S.W.2d at 82; see State ex rel. State Highway
Comm'n v. Conrad, 310 S.W.2d 871 (Mo. 1958), supporting method
of assessing in one sum the damages of all interests and then appor-
tionment of the damages among the various interests.
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The Hall decision has been frequently cited as supporting the
doctrine of valuating the property as a whole, and then apportion-
ing this fund among the various interests. However, the above
statement in Hall would indicate that separate valuation is neces-
sary when the separate damages to the various interests would
exceed the value of the property as a whole. Therefore, under Hall
all that would seem necessary to require separate appraisal is a
reasonable contention that the sum of the damages to the separate
interests exceeds the value of the property as a whole.
The majority of cases follow the general rule that the property
is valued as a unit, and then apportionment of this fund is made to
the various interested parties. 26 In State Highway Commission v.
Burk27 the Oregon Supreme Court adopted the majority view, but
seemed to go further by indicating that under no circumstances
could the amount of damages awarded exceed the value of the
property as a whole. The Oregon court in Burk decided that a con-
demnation proceeding is an action in rem; therefore, the amount
the condemnor is required to pay is the value of the property taken
and not the value of the separate interests.28 Those courts which
consider condemnation proceedings in rem seemingly foreclose the
possibility, even under the most exceptional circumstances, of ever
appraising the separate interest of each interested party. This con-
clusion was reached by the Alabama Supreme Court when it said:
No contracts between the owners of different interests in the
land can affect the right of the government to take the land for
the public use, or oblige it to pay by way of compensation more
than the entire value of the land as a whole.29
There are a minority of courts which hold that separate appraisal
is required where there are separate interests involved. The Georgia
Supreme Court in State Highway Department v. Thomas"0 indicated
26 E.g., In re Kansas Turnpike Project, 181 Kan. 840, 317 P.2d 384 (1957),
holding that the owner of a leasehold interest is not entitled to a sepa-
rate trial to determine compensation and damages; State v. Mahon,
350 S.W.2d 111 (Mo. App. 1961), following the doctrine that property is
to be valuated as a whole. See also State v. Montgomery Circuit Court,
239 Ind. 337, 157 N.E.2d 577 (1959); Lee v. Indian Creek Drainage
Dist. Number One, 246 Miss. 254, 148 So. 2d 663 (1963); Sowers v.
Schaeffer, 155 Ohio St. 454, 99 N.E.2d 313 (1951); Finley v. Board of
County Commissioners of Oklahoma Co., 291 P.2d 333 (Okla. 1955).
27 Z0o Ore. 211, 265 P.2d 783 (1954).284Id. at 245, 265 P.2d at 799. See also City of Dothan v. Wilkes, 269 Ala.
444, 114 So. 2d 237 (1959); Sowers v. Schaeffer, 155 Ohio St. 454, 99
N.E.2d 313 (1951).
29 City of Dothan v. Wilkes, 269 Ala. 444, 448, 114 So. 2d 237, 240 (1959).
30 115 Ga. App. 372, 154 S.E.2d 812 (1967).
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that separate valuation is required where different interests are
present. It was stated in Thomas that:
[U]nder our constitutional requirement, 31 that the condemnee be
paid 'just and adequate compensation! before his property is taken,
the question which properly addresses itself to the jury's consid-
eration, as in Missouri and Nebraska, is not '"hat has the taker
gained?", but "What has the owner lost?", and that where there
are separate interests to be condemned, the jury, in arriving at just
and adequate compensation, is not only authorized but required to
consider the value which the thing taken has to the respective
owners of the interests being condemned. If just and adequate
compensation to the owners of the various interests in the land
being condemned requires that the total compensation exceed the
value of the land, this presents no difficulty because, under
Bowers,3 2] and under the constitutional requirement mentioned,
the jury is not only required to render a verdict for an amount
which will justly and adequately compensate the condemnees for
the value of the land taken, but also for whatever damages result
to the condemnees from the condemnation proceeding.33
Thomas represents an extremely liberal interpretation of a state
constitution, and this broad interpretation has not been adopted by
any other court. Thomas and Bowers v. Fulton County3 4 represent
a minority viewpoint which is directly contrary to the majority
view concerning the problem of separate appraisal of separate inter-
ests in property. Located between these two opposing viewpoints
are a significant number of courts which hold that under certain
circumstances separate appraisal of the different interests will be
permitted.3 5
31 GA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 3, para. 1. The Georgia Constitutional provision
varies from the Nebraska provision in that it requires the compensa-
tion be both "just and adequate," while the Nebraska Constitution,
NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 21, only provides for 'just" compensation. The
Georgia Constitution also varies from the Nebraska Constitution in
that it requires payment to the condemnee before the property may
be taken, while Nebraska's Constitution only requires that compensa-
tion be paid for property taken or damaged.
32 221 Ga. 731, 146 S.E.2d 884 (1966).
33 115 Ga. App. 372, 376-77, 154 S.E.2d 812, 816 (1967).
34 221 Ga. 731, 146 S.E.2d 884 (1966). It should be noted that GA. CODE
ANN. § 36-504 (1962), provides that: "The assessors or a majority of
them, shall assess the value of the property taken or used, or damage
done .... :Provided, further, that nothing in this section shall be so
construed as to deprive the owner of the actual value of his property
so taken or used." This phrase would indicate that even without the
constitutional argument, the Georgia court would still be justified in
requiring separate valuation in cases where to fail to do so would
result in compensation that is less than actual loss suffered by the
injured parties.
35 E.g., United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 43 F. Supp. 687 (D.
Md. 1942); State ex rel. LaPrade v. Carrow, 57 Ariz. 429, 114 P.2d
891 (1941); Town of Perry v. Thomas, 82 Utah 159, 22 P.2d 343 (1933).
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EMINENT DOMAIN STATUTES IN OTHER STATES
In completing this analysis it is necessary to consider a cross
section of other state statutes and court decisions which interpret
them. The unit valuation doctrine is adhered to by the majority of
states, and the eminent domain statutes in those states are similar
to the Nebraska Uniform Eminent Domain Act. A minority of states
adopt the separate valuation doctrine, but these decisions seem
largely dictated by statutes which permit or require separate valua-
tion. Statutes in states which adhere to the unit valuation doctrine
will be considered and related to the Nebraska Uniform Eminent
Domain Act.
Missouri courts have consistently held since the 1930 decision
of State ex rel. McCaskill v. Hall 6 that the proper method of valua-
tion is to ascertain the value of the condemned land as a whole.
The Missouri Condemnation Act 37 provides that appraisers shall:
[A]ssess the damages which such owners may severally sustain
in consequence of the ... condemnation... to which petition the
owners of any or all as the plaintiff may elect of such parcels as
lie within the county or circuit may be made parties defendant
by names if the names are known, and by the description of the
unknown owners of the land therein described if their names are
unknown.8 s
The statute goes on to provide that "[a]ny number of owners,
residents in the same county or circuit, may be joined in one peti-
tion, and the damages to each shall be separately assessed by the
same commissioners." 39 This section has been interpreted to apply
to separate owners of different parcels of land. Missouri courts have
steadfastly applied the unit valuation doctrine under the above
statutes.
40
The Nebraska Uniform Eminent Domain Act is similar to the
corresponding Missouri statute in that neither statute expressly
provides for separate valuation of different interests in the con-
demned land; and neither specifically requires the condemnor to
bring in the owners of any remainder, reversion, mortgage, lease,
36 325 Mo. 165, 28 S.W.2d 80 (1930); accord, City of St. Louis v. Rossi,
333 Mo. 1092, 64 S.W.2d 600 (1933); State v. Mahon, 350 S.W.2d 111(Mo. App. 1961).
37 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 523.010 et. seq. (1953).
38 Id. § 523.010.
39 Id. § 523.020.
40 However, in Union Elec. L. & P. Co. v. Dawson, 228 Mo. App. 1224,
78 S.W.2d 867 (1934), the court held that a condemnor could join all
the parties with an interest in the land in one petition, and could have
their damages separately assessed. This case, although not specifically
overruled, has not been followed in Missouri, and also was decided
prior to adoption of section 523.010 of the Missouri statutes in 1939.
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security deed, or any other interest.41 Because of this similarity
between Nebraska's and Missouri's eminent domain statutes, Ne-
braska courts could receive guidance from Missouri decisions inter-
preting their statute.
The Kansas Eminent Domain Act 42 is similar to that of Nebraska,
and provides for court appointed appraisers "to determine the
damages to the interested parties resulting from the taking."43
However, Kansas does require the petition to include "(a) the
name of any owner and all lienholders of record, and (b) the
name of any party in possession."44 This statute seems to be
somewhat more explicit in requiring other interests to be brought
into the proceedings, but is still sufficiently similar to supply mean-
ingful precedent for determining this issue in Nebraska.
In Moore v. Kansas Turnpike Authority45 it was determined that
an owner of a leasehold estate has a separate interest from that of
his lessor and is entitled to compensation, but this right to share
in the compensation or damages awarded does not entitle the owner
of a leasehold to a separate trial to determine compensation and
damages for the separate interest appropriated. Thus, on the basis
of similarity between the Nebraska and Kansas statutes, it would
seem that Nebraska should apply the unit valuation doctrine.
In considering the minority of states following the separate
valuation doctrine, it is essential to note that the majority of these
states are bound or permitted by statute to do so. These states have
statutes which either specifically require or strongly allude to sepa-
rate valuation of the different estates in the property to be con-
demned. The Utah statute provides that:
The court, jury or referee must hear such legal evidence as may
be offered by any of the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon
must ascertain and assess:
(1) The value of the property sought to be condemned and all
improvements thereon appertaining to the realty, and of each and
every separate estate or interest therein; and if it consists of differ-
41 Nebraska does require ten days notice to be served upon the con-
demnee. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-706 (Reissue 1966). Condemnee is defined
in the statute as "any person, partnership, corporation, or association,
owning or having an encumbrance on any interest in property that
is sought to be acquired by a condemnor, or in possession of or occu-
pying any such property." NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-701(2) (Reissue 1966).
Missouri makes a party necessary only if they are in possession
or are the owner of record, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 523.010 (3).
42 KAi. STAT. AxN. §§ 26-501 to -516 (1964).
43 Id. § 26-504.
44 Id. § 26-502.
45 181 Kan. 840, 317 P.2d 384 (1957).
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ent parcels, the value of each parcel and of each estate or interest
therein shall be separately assessed. 46
The Utah courts have applied the separate valuation doctrine
specified in the statute, and in Perry v. Thomas47 the court, in
deciding that the condemned land was not properly described in
the condemnor's complaint, noted that under the statute each owner
is entitled to have separately assessed the value of the land in
separate ownership and each estate or interest therein.
The Arizona statute48 is similar to that of Utah and adheres to
the separate valuation doctrine. In Gilbert v. State,49 the Arizona
Supreme Court allowed the lessees damages for buildings which
the lessees erected on the land but did not remove, and applied
separate valuation in determining those damages.
Clearly, sections 76-706 and 76-710 of the Nebraska Uniform
Eminent Domain Act are not similar nor do they conform to those
statutes in other states which apply the separate valuation doctrine.
Sections 76-706 and 76-710 do not mention the matter of separate
valuation for different interests, and do not in any positive manner
allude to the subject of requiring or permitting separate valuation.
These sections resemble more closely statutes in those states which
follow the unit valuation doctrine. Therefore, on the basis of com-
parison, precedent would require Nebraska courts to apply the unit
valuation doctrine, although this result is in direct conflict with
prior Nebraska case law.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the Nebraska Uniform Eminent Domain Act
should be amended to provide for the separate valuation of different
estates or interests in real property.50 Such an amendment permit-
ting separate valuation of different interests would be consistent
with the Platte Valley decision holding that separate valuation is
desirable under certain circumstances. In addition, it would allow
Nebraska courts to remain internally consistent with prior deci-
sions, as well as establish external consistency between Nebraska
eminent domain statutes and the eminent domain statutes of those
states which adhere to the separate valuation doctrine.
46 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-10 (1953).
47 82 Utah 159, 22 P.2d 343 (1933).
48 AnRz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1122 (1956).
49 85 Ariz. 321, 338 P.2d 787 (1959); e.g., State v. Carlson, 83 Ariz.
363, 321 P.2d 1025 (1958).50 See appendix for suggested amendments to sections 76-706 and 76-710.
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Am amendment permitting separate valuation would also be
consistent with the fourteenth amendment 5' requirement as de-
fined in Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston.52 In that case the
Supreme Court stated that:
[T]he Constitution does not require a disregard of the mode of
ownership--of the state of the title. It does not require a parcel
of land to be valued as an unencumbered whole. It merely re-
quires that an owner of property taken should be paid for what
is taken from him. It deals with persons, not with tracts of land.
And the question is what has the owner lost, not what has the
taker gained.53
This decision furnishes support for the separate valuation doctrine
in circumstances where the sum of the value of the separate inter-
ests would exceed the value of the property taken as a unit. The
Boston decision is directly in conflict with those cases holding that
condemnation is an in rem action, for Boston determines that con-
demnation is instead an action in personam. Boston asserts that the
important determination is what the owner has lost, which by
analogy requires separate valuation of the various interests where
their total value would exceed the value of the property as a whole.
Therefore, strict compliance with the United States Constitution,
as well as the Nebraska Constitution, arguably requires that Ne-
braska amend the eminent domain statutes to allow separate
valuation.
An amendment permitting separate valuation when there are
different interests would promote fairness and judicial efficiency.
Under the unit valuation doctrine damages are determined for the
particular piece of property; in Nebraska the county judge must
then file an interpleader in the district court to apportion the fund
among the various interests.54 This interpleader in district court
51 U.S. CoxsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
52 217 U.S. 189 (1910).
53 Id. at 195; see United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 43 F. Supp.
687, 689 (D.C. Md. 1942), wherein it was decided that the owner of
an easement and the owner of the street bed are not jointly entitled to
compensation for the whole, and that their damages should be sepa-
rately determined. The court then added: "And it may be that the
sum of the respective values will be more or less than the value of
the whole parcel taken as an entity irrespective of the separate
valuations."
54 NEs. REv. STAT. §§ 76-706, -707, -710, -712 (Reissue 1966); the countyjudge has authority to appoint the appraisers, fill vacancies of ap-
praisers, and receive and certify the report of the appraisers. But
the county judge is not given the authority to apportion the total
amount of damages, as determined by the appointed appraisers, among
the various interests in the particular piece of property. Thus, he
must file an interpleader with the district court so that the fund
may be apportioned among the different estates.
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would be at the expense of the various interested parties, which in
many cases might amount to a substantial portion of the total
award. Separate valuation of the damages sustained by the separate
interests would eliminate the unnecessary expense of the inter-
pleader in the district court, and an auxiliary result would be a
reduction of the work load in district court, thus increasing judicial
efficiency.
John C. Person '70
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APPENDIX
Proposed Amendments to Nebraska Uniform Eminent Domain Act:
It is proposed that section 76-706 be amended to read as follows:
76-706. Upon filing of a petition under either section 76-704 or
76-705, the county judge within three days by order entered of
record shall appoint three disinterested freeholders of the county,
not interested in a like question, to serve as appraisers. The
county judge shall direct the sheriff to summon the appraisers so
selected to convene at the office of the county judge at a time
specified in the summons for the purpose of qualifying as ap-
praisers, and thereafter proceed to appraise the property sought
to be condemned and to ascertain and determine the damages sus-
tained by the condemnee or each condemnee separately where there
is more than one condemnee. * * * (Continue without change).
It is proposed that section 76-710 be amended to read as follows:
76-710. After the inspection, view and hearing provided for in
section 76-709 have been completed, the appraisers shall assess the
damages that the condemnee, or each condemnee separately where
there is more than one condemnee, has sustained or will sustain
by the appropriation of the property to the use of the condemner,
and make and file a report thereof in writing with the countyjudge.
